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HUMANITARIAN CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE CIVILIAN
VICTIMS OP WAR IN LIGHT OF THE REALITIES
OF MODERN ARMED CONFLICTS
THE NEED FOR THE PROTECTION OP THE CIVILIAN
POPULATION1
A. Introduction to the areas of protection
War, as it becomes more and more total, annuls
the difference which formally existed between armies




The words of Max Huber, former President of the
International Committee of the Red Cross, speaking at the
opening session of the 19U9 Geneva Convention ring true with
history. As nations have perfected the methods of waging
war on each other the destruction of human life has been a
burden which has been increasingly carried by the civilian
population. The days of knights engaging in personal duels
and of professional armies clashing on the field of battle
separate and apart from the noncombatant element is a thing
of the past. The totality of modern warfare has involved
the civilian population whether willingly or not. It is
estimated that in Austria and Germany during WTorld War I
there were 10,000,000 civilian dead with an equal number of

military victims. In World War II of the estimated 60,000,000
deaths from combat operations, 1;3»000,000 were civilians and
in the Korean Conflict the ratio of civilian to military
deaths had risen i+ to 1, The reasons for the increased ratio
of civilian victims are many. New military techniques such as
aerial bombardment have decreased the discrimination between
the combatant and the noncombatant victim. Weapons of mass
destruction can, in a single blow, bring total havoc to an
entire area and additionally, as the civilian population has
become more involved in the support of the war efforts of
their respective nations they have removed themselves from
the category of mere pawns of war.
The need for the protection of civilians can be divided
into three areas. First is the need for protection from
direct attack and for protection from the collateral conse-
quences of military operation conducted in the proximity of
their homes. Secondly is the need to protect civilians in
occupied territories and finally the need to protect civilians
who are interned as a result of the hostilities.^ Each of
these areas presents special problems of protection. Also,
cutting across all three areas is the question of the desir-
ability of providing unique protection to special groups
such as women, children, persons engaged in civil relief
efforts, medical personnel and local police forces. This
paper will focus its attention on the need for the re-
evaluation of the protection offered to the civilians in the
first mentioned area; the need for protection of the civilian
from the suffering caused during the initial phases of an

armed conflict, protection which should be granted to the
entire civilian population regardless of their special
category. While it is difficult to separate the emotional
aspects of offering special protection to those victims
who are the least able to protect themselves this should not
obfiscate the urgent need to develop viable protection for
all persons. The statistics are self evident. -^
J\e* .discuss new rules implies a lack of current standards.
fm • Prtii^'&'b or Lauteroacht states in discussing the 191+9 Geneva
Conventions
. . . there may be a tendency, when we speak of the
necessity of the revision of the laws of war, to leave
out of account the fact that these four conventions
have already revised a very substantial part of the
law of war and that they not only have revised it but
have also expanded it in many respects out of all
recognition."
Thus the problem is more than the establishment of new rules
*but the creation of an awareness of the humanitarian
considerations necessary for survival in a modern society.
We must reflect this new awareness as we approach these new
7problems.
'
The decline of our civilization may well be
measured by reference to the growing gaps between
human ideals solemnly affirmed in international
instruments and the growing brutalization of
civilians in armed conflicts. It can be measured
by reference to the ever more frequent disregard
of the unchallenged rule of international law
that noncombatants must not be made the object of
attacks unrelated to military ooerations and
directed exclusively against them.
B. The Blurring of the Civilian Population
with the Combatant
The distinction between the noncorabatant civilian

population and the combatant forces is not a concept embedded
in the history of warfare. The ancient ideas of war, up
until the middle ages, treated all persons; combatants, non-
combatants, women and children as objects of warfare, "as
actual enemies subject to slaughter" .9 The slaughter of
the civilian population, which may run contrary to the
humanitarian instincts of modern man, was the normal custom
during the Roman period.* The philosophy of war was to
completely destroy the will to resist. Thus in the time of
Alexander the Great "fruit trees were cut down, cornfields
were trampled, houses were burned, every kind of wanton
nil
ravage was brought ... until the military object could be
achieved. Whatever rules existed were rules based only upon
the military necessity of the operation and not upon any
12
sentimentality.
The circumstances of modern armed conflict have changed
the ancient concepts. Definite rules of war have been
developed. The purpose of these rules, as set forth by the
United States Department of the Army, are to diminish the
evils of war by:
(a) Protecting both combatants and none orabat ants
from unnecessary suffering;
(b) Safeguarding certain fundamental human rights of
persons who fall into the hands of the enemy,
particularly . . . civilians; and
(c) Facilitating the restoration of peace. *3
Basic to the rules are three guiding principles, military
necessity, humanity and chivilary .^ Thus the purpose and

basic principles have been to reduce the suffering of war and
to confine the conflict to the combatant participants. But
drafters of any rules have been faced with the difficulty in
drawing the "rigid line which used to divide members of the
combatant forces and civilians. 5 This problem is Intensified
by the growth of the numbers of noncombatants engaged in
activities which are connected with the prosecution of the war
effort and this has done much to "blur the distinction between
combatants and noncombatants" in modern times. *" This blur-
ring, caused by the increased participation of the civilian
community in the activities of warfare, is added to by the
fact that wars are no longer "fought by professional armies
in the interest of absolute monarchs"^-' but that warfare has
developed into conflict between peoples in which it is
Increasingly difficult to view the interstate armed conflict
as strictly restricted to battles between these professional
armies.
1"
The civilian population, the traditional noncombatants,
has, with the development of aerial warfare, made advances
in the mass destruction instruments of warfare such as the
atomic bomb, guided missies, smart bombs, and has been
drawn completely into the mainstream of warfare and is subject
therefore to dangers similar to those which face the combatant
forces. 1° The civilian is drawn into the conflict not solely
because of the inability of aerial bombardment to discriminate
between its victims nor because of technical advances in
weaponry but also because of an increased national self
identification and political awareness which makes the
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civilian somewhat of a voluntary participant in wars.
This trend has been noted by Professor Greenspan when he
stated:
Symptomatic of the engagement of the whole
population in war, World War II showed a significant
rise In the Importance of puerrilla warfare. Some
nations, overrun and occupied by the Axis Powers,
were only able to continue the war by the use of
guerrilla or resistance movements. 21
While this trend presents serious problems in the redefining
of the rules of war, problems which were not anticipated or
if anticipated side stepped by the drafters of the Hague
Regulations In 1399 and 1907, as well as the drafters of the
19i|9 Geneva Conventions, they are not the problems of
immediate concern. Needed Is adequate protection for the
civilian who is not an active participant in the conflict,
the individual whose only participation is that he is an
inhabitant in an area of the conflict. The immunity of such
noncombatants from direct attack is one of the fundamental
rules of the International Law of War." But such a funda-
mental principle has proven inadequate as is evident by the
increasing percentage of civilian deaths in each armed
conflict. Deaths caused not necessarily by direct attacks
but by the side effects of such direct attacks. As stated
by Jean Pictet:
[M]an's two main instincts, that of self
preservation and that of destruction, though
apparently opposed, are at times linked. The
instinct of self preservation must resort to
aggression, if it is to triumph. Man will
therefore seek to kill, and to make others
suffer as a result, in order to increase by
that much more his own chances of survival.
In his fellow man he sees a rival.

Among animals, the strong oppresses the weak,
Just as for thousands of years men obviously did
the same. Later the defense reaction was extended
to the group.
To make community life possible, society had
to be organized. Since it was impossible to change
man's nature, his instincts had to be curbed and he
compelled to accept reasonable solutions. The
group, by a decisive resolution, thus established
a social order based upon certain moral rules. ^3
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GENERAL SURVEY OP INSTRUMENTS OP PROTECTION
OFFERED BY THE COMMUNITY TO PARTICIPANTS
AND NON-PARTICIPANTS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
A. Non-SpecifIc Instruments of Protection
(A)s a logical outgrowth
. . . the idea
developed that only those who are actually able
and willing to participate actively in warfare
ought to be the objects of deliberate armed
action . . . This tendency toward humanization
of warfare . . . culminated in the great multi-
lateral treaties of. the nineteenth and early
twentieth century. *+
Hans J. Morgenthau
Early attempts to limit the suffering of the victims of
war were not designed to soecifically provide protection to
the civilian population. Any protection they received was
an outgrowth of the protection put forth In other areas.
The concern of the decision makers was not directed toward
the noncombatant. This was in part based on the European
view that war was struggle between states not peoples. ^5
At this time the humanitarian views of the twentieth century
had not come into prominence. Concern was for the suffering
of the combat victims of war, that is, the soldier in the
field. To achieve protection for the soldier in the field
attempts were made to control the instruments of warfare.
The first Dart of what was to later become the Law of the

Hague was developed at St. Petersburg in 1868. Czar
Alexander II convened a conference for the purpose of
"alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war""
The aim of St, Petersburg was set forth in the preamble:
The only legitimate object which states
should endeavor to accomplish during war is
to weaken the military forces of the enemy. ^7
In actuality the results of St. Petersburg, known as the
St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868, were a multi-lateral
disarmament treaty which restricted the use of any projectile
below the weight of i|00 grams which was either explosive or
charged with fulminating or inflammable substances. ^8 3ut
the Declaration is of more significance than as a mere
disarmament agreement. It marks the appearance of rules
based upon the humanitarian desires of nations to limit the
weapons of war because of the suffering they could inflict. ^9
By prohibiting the use of certain weapons nations would try:
... to infuse into warfare a spirit of
decency and of resoect for the common humanity
of all its orospective victims and to restrict
violence to the minimum compatible with the
goals of war; that is, breaking the enemies
will to resist. 30
In 1863, during the American Civil War, Professor
Francis Lieber of the Columbia College of New York published
his famous work Instructions for the Government of Armies of
the United States in the Field. 31 This work was the first
effort at codifying the various rules of custom and usage in
warfare into an authoritative code. As the order stated, "as
civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has
steadily advanced, especially in war on land, the distinction
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between the private individual belonging to a hostile
country and the hostile country itself, with its men in
arms. 32 This General Order was issued over the signature
of President Lincoln for the guidance of the Union Armies
in the conduct of the Civil War. Its significance transcends
that conflict because it instituted a trend which lead to
other nations issuing similar codifications. 33 The Lieber
Code was replaced in 1911}- by an Army Field Manual which up-
dated, is still in force today. 3U This manual is entitled
" The Laws of Land Warfare . "35
The ultimate in international accords not specifically
designed to be for the protection and amelioration of the
conditions of civilians during time of war was the Treaty
for the Renunciation of War As An Instrument of National
Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact) of 1928. 3° The result of
adherence to such a pact would have of course mooted the
necessity of developing specific protections. The treaty
shows the growing humanitarian concern during the period
between the Great Wars. The plenipotentiaries were "(d)eeply
sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of man-
kind. "37 Notwithstanding this deep sensibility, in little
more than ten years the world was again plunged into a con-
flict which ultimately would take the lives of 1^3,000,000
civilians. Empirically, the approach of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact was ineffective.
B. Specific Instruments of Protection
The publishing in 1861 of Henry Dunant's pamphlet
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A Memory of Solferlno recalling the French and Sardinian
campaign against Austria in 1856 in which 33,000,000
offit4-'rii and men were killed in the space of fifteen hours
caused the "Societe d'Utilite Publique" of Geneva, to
establish in 1363 a committee to study some of the proposals
set forth by Dunant for the protection of war wounded. 3$ The
committee proceeded to convene an international conference
.r>» Mfacfteen European nations. This conference established the
lliiaNBSWSwa movement. 39 jn the following year, 1861;, the Swiss
government extended an invitation to all European nations and
certain American nations to attend an international congress
for the purpose of establishing a treaty relative to the
protection of the wounded in time of war. The congress
drafted the Convention For The Amelioration Of The Conditions
Of Soldiers Wounded In Armed forces In The Field Of 1861+ .^
TAfhile this treaty dealt primarily with the protection of
hospitals, ambulances and other medical services for the
amelioration of war wounded soldiers it did provide, in
Article St that "[inhabitants of a country who may bring help
to the wounded shall be respected and shall remain free." By
1867 all the "Great Powers", with the exception of the United
States, had ratified the treaty. In 1882 the United States
ratified the treaty and it could therefore be said to have
gained, at that time, universal acceptance.^
Following the Red Cross Convention of 1861}., and the St.
Petersburg Declaration of 1868, the Russian Government once
more called an international conference for the purpose of
discussing International Rules on the Law and Usages of War.^2

12
The outcome of this conference was the Brussels Declaration.
This declaration, signed by all the plenipotentiaries of the
conference, failed to receive governmental ratification. h3
While the Declaration was not internationally effective
because of this lack of ratification it is significant in
that it is considered to be authoritative of the laws of war
as they existed at that time and, further, it formed the
basis of the convention with respect to the laws and customs
of war which was drafted at the first Hague Peace Conference
in 1899.
^
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, form an
important link in the evolution of the protection of the
civilian although these conferences did not deal directly
with this subject. Under the personal instigation of Czar
Nicholas II the first Hague Peace Conference was convened on
May 18, 1399.^ The conference soon abandoned its attempt
to limit armaments but did lay down three important
prohibitions:
(1) To prohibit the launching of projectiles and
explosives from balloons or other similar new methods.
(2) To prohibit the use of projectiles, the only
object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or
deleterious gases.
(3) To prohibit the use of bullets which expand or
flatten easily in the human body, such as bullet with
a hard envelope, of which the envelope does not
entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions.^
The main task of the first Hague Conference was the establish-
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ment of regulations respecting the laws and customs of war
on land, the basis of which was primarily the Brussels
Declaration.^"'
The final act of the conference recommended the conven-
ing of a second conference to complete the work of the first
conference. This second conference was held eight years
later on June 1$ , 1907, mainly at the insistence of the
government of the United States.^- The regulations regarding
the Laws and Customs of War became the fourth convention of
the thirteen conventions enacted in the final act of the
conference. 4-9
The Hague Conventions were from their inception
defective. The inadequacies of these laws of war, as
evidenced during the First and Second World Wars, were a
"consequence of the radical change of general conditions as
compared with those prevailing in 1899 and 1907.^
The events of the First and Second World Wars were the
basis in 19U9 for the first adequate attempt to bring
protection to the civilian victims of war. It was an attempt,
as stated by Jean Pictet, to "not confine itself ... to
protecting people who had already become victims of war - the
wounded, prisoners or internees; it had to prevent such
persons from becoming victims.
5
1 in the Second World War the
existing laws of war "were regularly and on a mass scale
violated by all the belligerents."^2 Most of the belligerents
forgot the rule of Article 22 of the IV Hague Convention that
the belligerent did not have the right to use unlimited means
for Injuring the enemy. For decades the International

Ik
Committee of the Red Cross had, in the face of "frequent
lack of understanding on the part of the authorities" ,53
be«n attempting to formulate stronger rule for the protection
of all war victims.^ On April 21, 19U9, the Swiss
Government-5? opened a diplomatic conference attended by some
sixty one states. 56 on August 12 of the same year seventeen




—rumpjMLnc called for that purpose on December 8, 19U9. The
•
.
'.-. fgSBbemtj convention was entitled the "Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in
the Armed Forces in the Field"5° and was a revision of a
similarily named convention signed in 1929. The second
convention was the "Geneva Convention of the Amelioration of
the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick and Shipwrecked Members
ra&f the Armed Forces at Sea"59 ancj was a revision of the Tenth
' Rcgue Convention of 1907, for the adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of the Geneva Convention of 1906. The third con-
vention was the "Geneva Convention Pelative to the Treatment
/ . ixf Prisoners of War"°° and revised another similarly named
convention of 1929. The fourth convention and "perhaps the
most important of the group"^ 1 was the "Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
.
.".'.-. &er. 2 This fourth convention "was entirely new"°3 and
covered ground not touched by the Hague Conventions. * As
pointed out by Jean Pictet,
it must be noted, however, that the Fourth
Geneva Convention protects civilians only against
abuses of power by the enemy authority. It does
not come within the sphere of the law of war and
the use of weapons, with the important exception

of the provisions protecting hospitals against
all attacks. &5
Notwithstanding Mr. Pictet's caveat, the changes intro-
duced by the convention did go beyond the mere extention of
the category of protected persons. The convention abolished
reprisals against civilians and their property and did away
with such customary rules as existed in the matter of taking
hostages."" The Convention further set forth "minimum
obligations of human treatment even in armed conflicts which
are not of an international character.""'
The first part of the fourth Geneva Convention deals
with the general protection of the civilian population
against the effects of armed conflict. The second part sets
forth rules for the protection of persons in belligerent and
occupied territory. The final part of this Convention
concerns enemy and alien civilians in belligerent countries.
While the Fourth Convention was a "great step forward
in the development of international law""^ some of the
provisions are merely permissive or voluntary. A few
examples
:
(1) In time of peace or after hostilities parties
may establish hospital and safety zones . . . Article
Ik
(2) Any party to the conflict may . . . propose . .
to establish . . . neutralized zones . . . Article 15
(3) Shall endeavor to conclude local agreements for
69
the renewal ... of wounded, sick . . . Article 17




PROTECTION FROM THE COERCION PROCESS UNDER
EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
For the last one hundred years the community decision
makers have been attempting through various agreements to
bring order to the area of armed conflict. In the words of
Professors McDougal and Feliciano:
A
. . . major objective (sought by authoritative
decision makers in the resolution of conflicting
claims respecting coercion) is the reduction to the
minimum, when the process of persuasion breaks down
and violence is in fact resorted to, of unnecessary
destruction of values. 70
Notwithstanding this objective
[T] he laws of war are observed because generally
speaking and by and large they help protect the
interests of both parties and promote the efficiency
of military operations. Whenever any of the laws of
war have been found to be a definite and permanent
obstacle to the achievement of the objectives of war
the sanction of the community interest and the reason
for the continuence of the rule has disappeared and y-»
the rule has not long been observed. (Emphasis added)
Even though there has been great vaccilation in the rules
of war and the protection offered by them, certain minimum
standards have emerged in contemporary international law. The
emphasis of these rules has been towards the protection of the
combatant both during the period that he is an active partici-
pant in a conflict* and especially after he ceases his active
role, i.e. becomes wounded, sick or a captive. But for the
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provisions of the Fourth. Convention of 19l|9, the protection
offered to the civilian population has been a spin off from
protections offered in other areas.
A e Claims Concerning the Protection of
Individuals
The basis of the traditional laws of war has been a
distinction between combatants and noncombatants. It is
stated by the United States Department of the Navy in its
publication governing the Laws of Naval Warfare that:
In accordance with this distinction the
population of a belligerent is divided into two
general classes; the armed forces (combatants)
and the civilian population (noncombatants).
Each class has specific duties and rights in
time of war and no person can belong to both
classes at the same time. 72
Further,
[u] nder customary international law,
individuals who do not form a part of the armed
forces and who refrain from the commission of
all acts of hostility must be safeguarded against
injury not incidental to military operations
directed against combatant forces and other
military objectives. 73
Thus the civilian population, the noncombatant is not a
"legitimate military object"?*!- and not subject to "direct
attack unrelated to a military objective or of attack • . .
for the purpose of terrorization'.'75 The civilians do not,
however, enjoy an absolute immunity. 76 Article 22 of the
IV Hague Pegulation orovides that the right of belligerents
to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited. This
prohibition is contained in the second section of those
regulations covering hostilities and deals with the means of
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injuring the enemy. As such it, in the traditional sense,
is directed toward the injury of the combatant participant.
Notwithstanding its emphasis and in light of the modern
tendency to consider wars not as between states but as
between peoples, this article has a basis in the advancement
of protection for civilians as well as combatants. However,
the ultimate goal should remain not the limitation of the
means to injure the civilian but rather his or her complete
protection.
The IV Hague Regulation did provide more specific
protection for the non-combatant population. It forbid the
compelling of the inhabitants of occupied territories to
"swear allegiance to the hostile power."' ' It provided that
"family honor and rights, the lives of persons, and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practices
must be respected. "7° it formally forbid pillage79 and it
provided further that "no general penalty, pecuniary or
otherwise," should be "inflicted upon the population on
account of the acts of individuals for which they could not
be regarded as being jointly or severally liable. "^
All these articles provided a general protection to the
civilian but they did not provide for specific protection
from the destruction of human values when he was caught in
the actual horrors of combat. Such protection was extended
only in a limited scale by Articles 25 and 26. These
articles provided that the attacking of undefended places
was prohibited and further that before the commencement of
bombardment, not connected with an actual assault, warning
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must be given to the local authorities. Nevertheless such
regulations were not designed to specifically provide
protection for the civilian population. As noted previously
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 191+9 was the first attempt
to deal directly and specifically with this problem.
Who are the persons protected by this Pourth Geneva
Convention? The governing provision is Article l\.. As stated
by Colonel Draper:
The class entitled to claim protection is wide,
embracing all persons who find themselves in enemy
hands. Nevertheless certain exceptions exist and
are pertinent when considering whether a "grave
breach" has been committed. "Grave breaches" can
only occur in resnect of persons or property protected
by the convention. Excluded from protection are all
nationals of a party not bound by the Convention.
Likewise certain nations of a Contracting Party may
be excluded from the orotection of the Convention.
For examole those nationals of a neutral state in the
territory of a belligerent state and also the
nationals of a co-belligerent, are not protected
persons under the Convention for as long as the state
of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic
representation in the state in whose hands they are.°l
Even though there are certain exceptions to the pro-
tection offered and certain classes of individual excluded
from the scope of the convention, the entire convention should
be given as liberal an interpretation as possible so as to
achieve the humanitarian objectives sought by the drafters.
Therefore, in determining the applicability of the
Conventions their purpose of extending humanitarian
protection to all war victims must be considered. They
were not intended to benefit states but individuals
and should always be interpreted to effect this
purpose. The result of denying the applicability of
the 19U9 Geneva Conventions in a given coercion
situation will be that the war victims involved will be
left virtually unprotected and the purpose of the
international decision makerg in drafting the
convention will be defeated. "2
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The purpose of the Convention is thus not to protect
all civilians In time of war but rather to protect certain
categories of oersons who had been determined to have been
placed under special disabilities. ^ The second part of the
Convention, however, has a wider application. Articles 13
through 26 afford general protection to the civilian
population against the consequences of war. ^ Articles ll\.
and 15 provide for the permissive establishment of hospital
safety and neutral zones. They seek to shelter "from the
effects of war certain classes of people who take no part In
the hostilities and perform no work of a military character. ->
The protected oersons are once again entitled in all circum-
stances to respect for their person, their honor, their family
rights, their religious convictions and practices and their
manners and customs. D Special protection is also set forth
In Article 2? for women against attacks on their honor.
B. Claims Concerning Areas of ODerations
i i M i i - - J - -1— — - —
At the present time belligerent operations may be
conducted in any areas except those territories of neutral
nations or those areas which the community of nations through
multilateral conventions has designated as special areas of
protection. As technological advances open new areas to the
exploration of man the arenas of operations also expand.
Today we are not only concerned with the actualities of armed
conflict on the land and sea masses of the world but of the
possibility of conflict taking place under the sea, in the
air spaces of nations and in outer space. Because the
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population of the world is confined, at the present time, to
the land area of the globe it is the restriction of
operations therein which must be of the most immediate
concern.
The limitation of the permissible areas of belligerent
operation has "given specific expression to the general
humanitarian principle in terms of a policy of limiting the
locale of violence.""' The neutral nations have by customary
international law been excluded from the permissible areas
for the conduct of belligerent operation. Such exclusion is
significant in that it establishes large areas of safety
which can be used for the protection not only of the
population of the neutral areas but also as refuge for persons
attemoting to flee combat taking place in authorized areas
of oneration. The use of such neutral nations will be
discussed subsequently but it suffices to say that such
nations cannot under the present state of international law
open their doors and accept the entire population of
belligerent nations for in so doing they would certainly be
unwillingly drawn into the conflict.
Within the permissible areas of oneration of belligerent
activities the world community, under existing international
law, has established certain areas the purpose of which is to
afford protection for the civilian populations. Utilizing
the basic premise of the Fourth Hague Regulation; that the
means of inflicting injury on the enemy is not unlimited,
the international community has sought to establish within
the nermissible areas of oneration the machinery for the
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establishment of areas of immunity. Thus in Article ll| of
the Civilian Convention of the 19l|9 Geneva Convention it is
provided tnat in time of peace or after the outbreak of
hostilities the parties may establish within their own
territories hospital and safety zones and, additionally,
localities organized for the protection of the sick and
wounded, the aged, children and expectant mothers. The
Ao
Cot,ven*.* t . further provides^ 7 that the parties to a conflict
may thrwi^h written negotiated agreement establish zones of
neutrality within the areas of permissible operations where
the fighting is taking place. Such areas are intended for
the protection of all sick and wounded combatants or non-
combatants as well as those civilians who are taking no
active part in the conduct of the belligerent operations.
-The humanitarian motives behind such provisions are
clear but they suffer the weakness of only being permissive
in nature. High humanitarian goals in time of peace even
though they be motivated by recent and vivid memories of the
horrors of war tend to lose their luster when nations once
more engage in conflict. V.'hile hospitals have received
general protection throughout the course of conflicts the
attempts to establish comparable safety localities have
90nmet with much less success."
The international community has attempted to establish
rules which would facilitate the establishment of such zones
of immunity within the permissible areas of operation. The
91
opening article of the Third Hague Regulation stated:
The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities
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between themselves must not commence without
previous and explicit warning, in the form
either of a reasonable declaration of war or
an ultimatum with declaration of war.
With such a warning, authorized zones could be established
and adequate notification of their location given. Pro-
tection is given the opposing belligerent power from the fear
that such zones might be used to illegally protect legitimate
military objectives. Article 28 of the Civilian Convention
specifically provides that the presence of protected persons
may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from
military operations.
A serious problem in the establishment of zones of
immunity within permissible areas of operations is that of
establishing such zones during armed conflicts not of an
international nature. The regulations referred to above
apply, in general, to armed conflicts between contracting
parties and are thus of an international character. But in
the non-international conflict the only protection offered is
that found in Article 3 of the Conventions. 92 The protection
of certain human rights is the chief purpose of Article 3
just as it is, in more detail, in the other articles dealing
with the protection to be offered in a conflict of an inter-
national nature. The minimum standards established in
Article 3 do not provide for the details of such zones of
immunity as well as the details of other basic provisions.
Since the purpose of all the rules is humanitarian the words
of Professor 3ond are particularly pertinent:
The language of Article 3 is unfortunately
general, but selective incorporation of the more
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detailed rules of the Geneva Conventions can flesh
out Its general language. V.'hile It is true that
the legislative history of Article 3 shows no
intent to incorporate all the Convention provisions
their purpose was indentical; to ameliorate the
sufferings of war. -And It is the nature of the
suffering to be alleviated, not the nature of the




C. Claims Concerning Weapons of Attack
War has through the years become an instrument of national
policy for most of the civilized nations of the world. Pew
nations have had the courage to declare their permanent
neutrality and to successfully carry through such a national
policy. The notable exception has been the Swiss. However,
even in this case the neutrality was guaranteed initially only
by the force of other nations. It was the Declaration of
Vienna in which the Austrians, French, British, Prussian and
Russian governments guaranteed the integrity of Switzerland. °4
The Swiss status of neutrality has been carried through into
their constitution.^ But such action by a nation has serious
drawbacks in the world community of today. Because of her
neutrality Switzerland was unable to adhere fully to the
collective defense provisions of Articles 11 through 16 of the
Covenent of the League of Nations and was accepted for member-
ship only by reason of a special resolution. °° Today she is
not a member of the United Nations. Her action has excluded
her from the community enlightenment process although, in
fairness, it must be stated that the uniqueness of her position
has diminished greatly the disadvantages which might have
accrued from her exclusion from such a community organization
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as the United Nations.
Realizing the need to control the weapons of war,
nations. have engaged in numerous attempts to ban specific
weapons and to limit, both quantitively and qualitatively,
certain weapons of war. The ultimate objective of such
efforts can be easily cast in the mantle of humanitarianistic
considerations. The attempts of the nations of the world to
control the weapons and means of waging war are as long and
vwa&u&%am «he wars that they have tried to control. Probably
the first recorded effort to limit man power and the weapons
of war was an agreement reached in 600 B.C. between the
warring Chinese states in the Yantze valley. 97 This agreement
resulted in a period of peace which lasted for more than 100
years. While attempts such as this early effort by the
Chinese have been successful in postponing the real dangers
.of war, others have had little success in getting off the
ground. As the methods of engaging in war have become more
sophisticated the necessity of controlling these methods has
become more imperative. Weapons of mass destruction have the
power to destroy without discrimination the participants and
the non-participants in a conflict.
The first modern attempt to formally control arms was
the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1863, which, on a multi-
lateral basis, restricted the use of any projectile below
the weight of I4OO grams that was either explosive or charged
with fulminating or inflammable substances. 98 This conference
and the resulting declaration marks the appearance of rules
based uoon the humanitarian desires of nations to limit the
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weapons of war because of the suffering they might inflict.^9
The efforts of the St. Petersburg Conference were followed by
two "peace" conferences held at the Hague in 1399 and 1907.
The conference of 1899 attempted to limit several types of
weapons, gun powder and the submarine but was only successful
in producing a prohibition on aerial bombardment (the Balloon
Declaration). By the time of the second conference in
1907, the popular wave of support for disarmament had subsided.
With the public no longer calling for active arms control and
with the technical advances that had been achieved or were
forseen in the use of the aircraft as military weapons,
adherence to the Balloon Declaration by the participants of the
conference declined. 101 The IV Hague Regulation did forbid
the employment of poison and poison weapons and the use of
arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary
suffering. 102
By and large the attempts to control weapons, certainly
one of the most effective means of reducing harm to those
involved in conflict, has been ineffective. It is ably put
by Dr. Royce in his book Aerial Bombardment and the
International regulation of Warfare
.
Historically only weapons regarded as obsolete,
marginal or indecisive and militarily ineffective -
weapons which did not or could not be expected to
yield a substantial net military advantage after
discounting the concomitant destruction of values,
such as poison arms or expanding bullets- have been
successfully proscribed. 103
The greatest threat to the civilian population in modern
armed conflict is the use of aerial bombardment as a weapon
of war. As wars have orogressed the protection of civilians
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from the destruction of values caused by bombardment has
become less and less.
That result was not due merely to the
reciprocal adoption of the practice of reprisals.
It was due to the general acceptance of a motion
of military objective capable of an enlargement
so vast as to lose infact any legally relevant
content.lOU
D. Claims Concerning Objects of Attack
What is a legitimate object of attack is often in the
eye of the beholder. The attacking belligerent claims that
the object is of military significance whereas the defender
claims that the act was a wanton disregard for human values
and designed merely to terrorize the population. The status
of objects is clear when it is a tank moving down a road.
The status of the object becomes less clear when it is a
factory in the center of a populated area or a field of wheat
which could be used to feed the army or the civilians. As
stated by Professor KcDougal and Feliciano:
The underlying principles which seek to regulate
target selection are, once again, the principle of
military necessity and of minimum destruction of
values. Military necessity finds expression in the
specific prescription that, most generally character-
ized, permits the exercise of violence against
objects constituting substantial bases of enemy power
and utilized in prosecuting or resisting the
political demands at stake in the conflict. The
countervailing humanitarian principle is observable
in the limitations that operate to prohibit both the
projection of violence against objects which are not
substantial elements of enemy power and the
continuation of violence against objects already
rendered ineffective . . .105
Certainly the soldier and those participants actively
engaged in the prosecution of the war effort become legitimate
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objects of violence. Professor Lauterpacht in writing on
the need for revision of the laws of war has stated that
the "unchallenged principle" of humanity "is embodied in
the rule that noncombatants, whether in occupied territory
or else where, must not be made the object of attack
unrelated to military operations and directed exclusively
against them.''^^" This of course does not solve the problem
of whether or not the belligerent must refrain from attack-
ing a legitimate object because of the immediate presence of
large numbers of civilians. Certainly, as set forth in
Article 28 of the Civilians Convention of 19i|9, the presence
of protected persons may not be used to render a point
immune from military operations. Thus the defenders cannot
herd large groups of civilians into areas which are legitimate
objects of attack in order to attempt to defend them in such
a manner. 1^7
The destruction inflicted by armed attack must, as in
the case of all destruction of values in time of war, have
a military relevance and must have a "reasonably close
connection"10o with a legitimate objective. Thus the Hague
Regulations of both 1899 and 1907, permitted bombardment
only on "defended places" and prohibited the bombardment of
those areas which were "undefended" . 109
The Korean Conflict did alter the international law with
respect to the exemption of small coastal fishing craft
operated by civilians as being legitimate objects of attack.
In THE PAQUETE HABANAHO the United States Supreme Court
reiterated the rule of international law that small coastal
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fishing vessels could engage in their local fishing
activities without being subject to capture. During the
Korean Conflict the United States blockading forces made
no exception for the usually exempt fishing craft and all
were seized and destroyed.m The purpose of those actions
was to cut off a main food source for the North Korean and
Chinese Communist troops as fish was a staple in the diets
of both armies, but the effect was to expand the concept of
what constituted legitimate objects of attack in a time
when the humanitarian concerns of the world were attempting




THE CONTEMPORARY CONCEPT OF PROTECTION AS VIEWED
BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OP THE RED CROSS
The 1914-9 Civilian Convention was a step in the right
direction. It was the first attempt to provide specific
protection to the noncombatants. It was not the mere
redefining of existing rules but was a new and distinct
approach - "a completely new and separate"^-^ treaty. A
treaty which was to contain "its own rules of application. nH3
This convention attempted to draw ud detailed rules covering
"all possible eventualities". ™ The convention as stated in
Article 15U was in "Suoplement to sections II and III" of the
Hague Regulations. Notwithstanding its expressed objectives
and its new approach the convention has fallen short of
meeting the contempory need for positive protection of the
civilian population. The convention provides only minimum
protection based upon general humanitarian principles for the
civilian population involved in armed conflict "not of an
international nature. "H5 The convention does not provide
for mandatory protection in many needed areas such as hospital
safety zones, zones of safety and zones of immunity. Emphasis
within the convention is on the protection of civilians after
occuoation, and of the protection of internees. The
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protection of the civilian population from the dangers
incidental to an armed attack on the territory in which they
reside is not adequately dealt with. Realizing the inherent
weaknesses of this convention efforts within the world
community have been initiated to bring the convention more
into line with the realities of modern armed conflict.
A. The Approach of the United Nations
Since the cease fire ending the June 1967 "Six Day War"
in the Middle East, the United Nations has intensified its
effort to enhance respect for human rights in armed conflicts
especially those as relate to the rights of the civilian
population. In a resolution passed a week after the
termination of hostilities between the Arabs and the Israeli
forces the Security Council stated:
Considering the urgent need to spare the civil
population ... of additional sufferings,
Considering that essential and inalienable human
rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes
of war,
Calls upon the government of Israel to ensure the
safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of
the area when military operations have taken place . . .
Recommends to the governments concerned the scrupulous
respect of the humanitarian principles governing . . .
the protection of civilian persons in time of war,




The following year the International Conference on
Human Rights was convened at Teheran. This Conference, held
during the International Year for Human Rights, in its final
act, passed a resolution on human rights in armed conflicts.
H"
The resolution stated that:
Considering
. . . that the Red Cross Geneva Conventions
of 19U9, are not sufficiently broad in scope to cover
all armed conflicts,
Noting that states parties to the Red Cross Geneva
Conventions sometimes fail to appreciate oheir
responsibility to take steps to insure the respect of
these rules in all circumstances . . .
called upon the Secretary General of the United Nations to
study:
(a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better
application of existing humanitarian international
conventions and rules in all armed conflicts;
(b) The need for additional international conventions
or the possible revision of existing conventions to
insure the better protection of civilians . . .
In the following session of the United Nations, ^9 that
organization adopted inter alia a resolution which dealt with
the subject of the "Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts/' This resolution 2l\kk (XXIII) took note of the
''Teheran Proclamation'' and affirmed the need to implement
the provisions of that resolution as soon as possible.
1
2
The resolution further formally called upon the Secretary
General in consultation with the International Committee of
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the Red Cross to study those areas which had been proposed
for study in the "Teheran Proclamation.
"
121 The Secretary
General was further directed to report the steps that he had
taken at the following session of the General Assembly.
The next year the Secretary General submitted his
report. ^2 This preliminary report was adopted by the General
Assembly on 16 December, 1969, in a resolution in which the
Assembly, among other things, requested the Secretary General




t\± (XXIII) with special attention being given
to the necessity of protecting civilians especially in armed
conflicts which arose from peoples struggles to free them-
selves from colonial and foreign rule. ^
In September 1970, the Secretary General submitted his
second report. 12U This report dealt extensively with the
question of civilians and the need for their adequate pro-
tection. The report suggested the formulation of detailed
minimum standards which would amplify the three basic
principles set forth in General Assembly Resolution k/2\\h^
(XXIII ) .5 The Secretary General recommended that the rules
apply to any situation which was an armed conflict "without
further qualification" 12 ^ The rules were to establish
standards in the following areas:
(1) Prohibition of direct attacks
(2) Prohibition of attacks on civilian refugees,
safety zones and sanctuaries




(i|) Prohibition of use of civilians to shield
military operations
(5) Placing of obligations on attacking commanders
to insure objects of attack were not for exclusive
civilian use
(6) Obligation on parties to insure minimum loss
to civilians in vicinity of an attack
(7) Obligation of parties to remove civilians from
vicinity of an area likely to be attacked
(8) To endeavor to keep large armed forces from
being situated in heavily populated areas
(9) The entitlement of civilians to receive
international assistance. '
The report of the Secretary General took a favorable view
of the need to establish, on a larger scale than provided for
under the 19i|9 Geneva Conventions, a system of refuges and
sanctuaries drawing attention to the successful agreement for
the protection of cultural property negotiated at the Hague
in 195>U« The object of such new regulations was to do away
with the inadequacies of the 19L|9 Geneva Conventions which
did not establish any obligation on the part of any of the
contracting oarties to establish such zones although they are
129generally provided for in the Conventions. 7 Such refuges
and sanctuaries as proposed by the Secretary General would
have to meet strict conditions concerning their selection,
130
designation and location. It would orovide for a system
of registration of such areas similar to that set forth in the
131
195U convention on cultural property.
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The second report of the Secretary General also set
forth rules and suggestions for the protection of persons
In Internal armed conflicts. The report suggested the
expansion of the common Article 3 of the I9I4.9 Geneva
Conventions by adding the following classifications of persons
to those already set forth in Article 3»
(1) Those whose conduct and activities have no
relation what so ever to the conduct of hostilities.
(2) Those who participate or assist whenever such
participation or assistance is under duress. .
(3) Those who merely express opinions critizing the
132government or favoring the uprising. J
The twenty fifth session of the United Nations considered
the Secretary General's two reports and adopted a series of
resolutions dealing with the area of respect for human rights
in armed conflicts. In Resolution A/2671 (XXV) the General
Assembly condemned the actions of countries which, in violation
of the Charter of the United Nations, continued to conduct wars
of aggression and defied the principles of the Geneva Protocol
13i±
of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949* The resolution
further considered that these conventions and protocol should
be strictly observed and that those states which acted in
violation of them should be condemned and held responsible to
the world community.
135
In Resolution A/2675 (XXV) the General Assembly, in
noting that the international community has accepted an
increased role and new responsibilities for the alleviation
of human suffering especially during armed conflicts and
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recalling the importance of the strict observance of the I9I4.9
Geneva Conventions, affirmed certain basic principles for the
protection of the civilian population in armed conflicts, to
wit:
(1) Fundamental human rights, as accepted in
international law and laid down in international
instruments, continue to apply fully in situations
of armed conflict.
(2) In the conduct of military operations during
armed conflicts, a distinction must be made at all
times between persons actively taking part in the
hostilities and civilian populations.
(3) In the conduct of military operations, every
effort should be made to spare civilian populations
from the ravages of war, and all necessary precautions
should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to
civilian populations.
(1+) Civilian populations should not be the object
of military operations.
(5) Places and areas designed for the sole protection
of civilians, such as hospital zones or similar
refuges should not be the object of military
operations.
In its final resolution on the subject of the "Respect
for Human Pights in Armed Conflicts" 1^ the General Assembly
noted the continuing value of the existence of humanitarian
rules covering armed conflicts and in particular the 1899 and
1907 Hague Conventions and the 191*9 Geneva Conventions but
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that such rules did not meet the needs of contemporary
conflicts. The assembly re-affirmed the principles set forth
at the Teheran Conference and in its own resolution A/2b,l\l±
(XXIII) and called upon all nations to observe the Hague and
Geneva Conventions, further calling upon the Secretary General
to solicit comments on his second report and to report the
results of these comments and the development coming out of
the 1971 International Committee of the Red Cross Convention
which was scheduled for 2i\. May to 12 June 1971 in Geneva.
1^7The third report of the Secretary General •" set -forth
a summarization of the work of the 1971 International
Committee of the Red Cross Conference of Governmental Experts
held in Geneva.
B. The International Committee of the Red
Cross T Approach
1. 1971 Proposals
In September 1969 the XXIst International Conference of
the Red Cross, held in Istanbul, unanimously adopted a
resolution, entitled "Re-affirmation and Development of the
138
Laws and Customs Applicable in Armed Conflicts," which
requested the International Committee of the Red Cross to
actively pursue its efforts with respect to the formulation
of concrete rules to supplement those humanitarian rules
currently in effect. On the basis of this resolution the
International Committee of the Red Cross organized a
Conference of Government Experts which was to meet in Geneva
from 2i| May to 12 June 1971. Invitations were sent to thirty
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nine nations and the Secretary General of the United Nations
to attend this conference. ^ During the opening session it
was decided that the experts attending the conference would
express personal opinions not binding upon the governments
which appointed them and that the conference would reach no
decisions and pass no resolutions. * The considerations of
the Conference were based primarily upon eight documents
which had been previously orepared by the International
Committee of the Red Cross. -^l The agenda of the Conference
was to consider the following:
(a) Protection of the wounded and sick
(b) Protection of victims of non-international armed
conflicts
(c) Rules applicable in guerrilla warfare
(d) Protection of the civilian population against
dangers of hostilities
(e) Rules relative to behavior of combatants
(f
)
Measures intended to reinforce the implementation
of the existing laws. ^
The items on the agenda were allocated among four committees.
Committee III considered the question of the protection of the
civilian population, a question which in previous years had
met with less than an enthusiastic reception. As stated by
Mr. M. A. Naville, President of the International Committee of
the Red Cross and Chairmen of the Conference, in his opening
remarks
:
The work cariied on in 1956 and 1957 led to the
submission to the XlXth International Conference of
the Red Cross of draft rules for the limitation of the
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dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in time
of war. The draft met with a cool reception from
governments.
However, since that time world opinion and




At the first plenary session, the governmental experts,
on the whole, considered that care should be taken not to
raise the question of the complete revision of the 191+9
Geneva Conventions because it was felt that they would be
weakened by such considerations. Rather, it was decided that
it would be better to reaffirm these conventions because they
constituted the basis of all future developments. hU It
would be necessary therefore to draft new texts in those areas
where the oresent conventions had proven to be inadequate by
reason of the new humanitarian concerns of the world community.
The approaches of the experts to the new challenges were
varied. Some experts advocated the maintaining and consoli-
dating of international oeace in accordance with the principles
of the Charter of the United Nations. 1^ Others were of the
opinion that it was indeed sad, in view of Article 2 (l\.) of
the Charter, that there had to be studies of the law of armed
conflict and that a review of the efforts had not eliminated
war but only limited its evils. 1U° Some experts felt that the
humanitarian aims should be towards the suppression of
weanons^7 while others felt thr»t peace could only be achieved
through bi and mult I lateral agreements, ^-m-'" A split in
opinion was also evident on whether or not the distinction
should be maintained as between Articles 2 and 3 of tn©
present Geneva Conventions . 1U9
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Turning to the consideration of Document III concerning
the protection of the civilian population the final report
of the International Committee of the Red Cross stated that
the results were encouraging" .^50 What did this document
1^1
recommend ^ and what was the approach of the International
Committee of the Red Cross? In the introduction to Document
III it is stated that:
(t)he Red Cross, born on the battlefield,
was mainly concerned, at the start of its history,
with caring for the sick and wounded because at
that time, the civilian population was not
subjected to the suffering that it has known in
modern armed conflicts. Nevertheless, following
a development due mainly to improved artillery
and aviation, particularly during the first V.orld
V.'ar, situations in v/hich civilians found them-
selves equally exposed to dangers, if not more so,
than combatants, became more and more frequent.
V/hile still registering its opposition to the very
nature of war, the Red Cross was called upon to
work on behalf of fresh victims. 152
The slant of* this third Document was toward the development of
basic rules to be inserted into a protocol -^ and the idea
that the protection due to the civilian population against the
dangers of military operations should be the same in all
situations and in all types of armed conflicts.l5<4-
Thus as far as the Red Cross was concerned it was:
Mainly the notion of civilian population and
non-military objects which must be seek (sic) in
order to attempt to establish a few basic rules of
protection for the benefit of the civilian
population. This will also lead to an examination
of the notion of military objectives, on the
subject of which it is noted that there is an
absence of precision and unanimity liable to bring
about, in practice, serious abuses from which the
civilian pooulation suffers. 155
The International Committee of the Red Cross' approach
1^6
consisted, mainly, of defining illicit objectives. -' To this

end the Red Cross put forward certain concrete proposals and
set out other norms of International law. They set forth
specifically that:
In the conduct of military operations, a
distinction must be made at all times between,
on the one hand, persons who directly participate
in military operations and, on the other hand,
persons who belong to the civilian population. 157
The norms of international law established no absolute immunity
for civilians against attack. 15° These norms do forbid the
mounting of a direct attack against civiliansl59 ancj forbid
authorities from exposing civilians to direct attack. "° On
the basis of these norms the Red Cross proposed that:
The civilian population shall enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military
operations. The civilian population should not,
in particular, be the object of attack . . .
Nevertheless, civilians whose activities directly
contribute to the military effort, assume, within
the strict limits of these activities and when
they are. within a military objective, the risk
resulting from direct attack against that
objective. l&l
The International Committee of the Red Cross did endorse
certain areas of special protection in the case of women,
children, wounded, sick and infirm, journalists and police and
firemen. The Red Cross did not propose any drafts on the
question of populated areas under special protection such as
refuges and sanctuaries .162 Specific ideas were set forth in
other areas. The Secretary General had suggested in his
second report that minimum guarantees would apply in any armed
conflict without any further qualification and further that
such minimum guarantees would apply whether or not the conflict
was of an international or national character and to all acts
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of violence committed against an adverse party by force of
arms whether in defense or in offense. ^°3 The International
Committee of the Red Cross similarly suggested in their
proposals that the basic rules to be included in a protocol
should apply in all types of armed conflicts. ^-"4
As previously noted, General Assembly Resolution 2144;
(XXIII) provided that at all times the distinction between
persons taking part in the hostilities and the civilian
population must be maintained so that the members of the
civilian population will be spared as much as possible from
the sufferings of the hostilities. This was further amplified
in the basic principles set forth in General Assembly
Resolution 2675 (XXV) wherein it was stated that in the conduct
of military operations during an armed conflict a distinction
must be made between persons actively taking part in the
hostilities and the civilian population and, further, that
every effort should be made to spare the civilian population
from the ravages of war. Civilians should not be made the
objects of military operations. This theme was reaffirmed by
the International Committee of the Red Cross in their proposals
set out in Document III. These proposals stated that:
(a) the obligation to make, at all times, a
distinction between persons directly participating
in military operations and persons belonging to the
civilian population,
(b) the obligation to spare the civilian population
as much as possible,
(c) the obligation to restrict in all circumstances,
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attacks to military objects alone. ^"5
Much effort has been expended by all participants in
attempting to define the civilian population. The Secretary
General realized that a "general understanding of the term
"civilians" or "civilian population" for the purpose of the
applicability of the proposed standard minimum rules "would
have to be achieved in order to insure the identity of the
beneficiaries of any changes. 1°6 ^he Secretary General's
approach was a somewhat negative definition. Those not taking
part in the hostilities would be considered civilians, 1^7 the
following would not be classified as civilians:
(a) members of the armed forces or of their
auxiliaries or complementary organizations
(b) persons not belonging to the forces referred
to above but nevertheless taking pert in the
fighting or contributing directly to the conduct
of military operations. 1°°
Any person not falling within the categories set out would be
considered to be a valid civilian and subject to protection
from attack.
The International Committee of the Red Cross approached
the matter in a similar manner. They proposed two draft
definitions. In the first, civilians were defined as those
individuals who did not form a part of the armed forces or
who did not directly participate in military operations. It
was further stated in this first draft that individuals whose
efforts contributed directly to the military effort did not,
for that reason alone, lose their status as civilians. The

second proposed draft of the Red Cross would have eliminated
this caveat. 169
The Secretary General had dealt with precautionary
measures which were necessary for the protection of the
civilian populations. The need for such warnings had previously
been acknowledged by the world community and has become "one of
the few mandatory obligations which has been passed from one
170
convention to another. The Secretary General referred to
the obligation of the authority ordering an attack to insure
that the object of such an attack was not the civilian
population nor those dwellings nor means of transportation
171
established for their exclusive use. ' The approach of the
International Committee of the Red Cross was to propose
"active" and "passive" precautionary obligations. 1 '^ Active
precautions would place the obligation on the authority which
ordered an attack to insure that all necessary steps were
taken to spare the civilian Dopulation and those non-military
objects designed for their use. " To this end the proposals
set forth a statement that members of the civilian population
should benefit from the oresumption that they do in fact belong
,to the civilian oonulation and that non-military objects
should benefit from the oresumption that they have in fact no
military neture. '^ Passive precautionary measures place
obligations on both sides to take measures to protect the
civilian oopulatlon. These measures would include a general
obligation to take all necessary steps to protect the
population and objects from dangers of military operations and
to remove military objectives from threatened areas or avoid
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the permanent presence of such objects in densely populated
175areas. lJ
As in any conference of this nature the proposals initially
put forth, in this case by the eight working documents drafted
by the International Committee of the Red Cross, were only
the starting point. Various draft formulations were presented
by the some 200 experts in attendance. As previously stated,
the conferees in their basic rules had decided that the
Conference would pass no resolutions nor make any decisions, 176
that the experts would express only their opinions which would
not be binding upon their respective governments, although
the opinions certainly reflected the instructions which they
had received and thus in reality were the opinions of
government. This conference in 1971 was a collecting house
for ideas. As such it was successful in bringing the many
and varied opinions of the world community to a central
location from which they could be evaluated, modified and
hopefully codified into a significant new agreement which would
extend much needed protection to those individuals who under
existing international law were unprotected or inadequately
protected. It was not possible for this Conference to fully
deal with all the items on the agenda and therefore it was
desirable that an additional conference be convened. On
27 September 1971 the International Committee of the Red Cross
sent invitations to all states which were parties to the 19i|9
Geneva Convention and to the Secretary General of the United
Nations to delegate exoerts to attend a Conference to be held




At the close of the 1971 Conference the delegates had
before them extensive documentation both as Initially presented
by the International Committee of the Red Cross and as
submitted by the various governmental experts. With all this
material before the conference it was felt that a new start
was needed. The Conference then recommended that the
International Committee of the Red Cross endeavor to prepare
complete and specific new drafts. ^7° With this mandate the
President of the Red Cross stated at the final meeting of the
1971 session:
The ICRC will endeavor to draw up for the next
session a series of draft protocols, bearing in mind
as far as oossible the various opinions expressed
here but without necessarily proposing compromise
solutions or seeking systematically a kind of common
denominator easily acceptable to all parties. Each
article will be accompanied by a brief comment, but
the eight fascicles which you have received will
still be the basic documentary material as well as.
of course, the report of the present conference.^ '
°
In preparation for the drafting of new regulations and
in accordance with the desires of the 1971 conferees the
International Committee of the Fed Cross sent a questionnaire
to all states party to the 1914-9 Geneva Conventions so that
they could make known their feelings concerning certain
measures designed to reinforce the present Conventions .130
Prior to the convening of the second conference the
International Committee of the Red Cross submitted to the
various governments their draft texts which were to be the
basis for discussion at the forthcoming conference. There were




applicable to armed conflicts of an international nature,
and the second draft was applicable to armed conflicts not of
an international nature. ™2
In 1972 the International Committee was thus changing its
approach. At the first Conference the International Committee
and many of the expert attendees had envisaged the drafting of
a series of distinct agreements relating to the areas of
concern, specifically the protection of wounded, sick and
shipwrecked persons, of the civilian population and of
combatants . 1°3 At the time of the drafting of the new proposed
protocols, the International Committee of the Red Cross thought
that it would be advisable to submit one draft which would
modify all four of the 19^9 Geneva Conventions. The reasoning
behind this decision was three fold:
(1) The concern for maintaining the unity of
international humanitarian law, the Geneva conventions
having always been considered as forming a whole.
(2) The advantage of having a single protocol.
(3) The desire bo avoid the complex treaty relations
between the states concerned which might result from
the existence of a series of distinct legal
instruments . 1°*+
The first draft protocol, dealing with armed conflicts
of an international nature, was divided into six parts. 1S5
The draft was to be applicable in all situations provided for
in common Article 2, of the 19U9 Geneva Conventions. The new
convention was to apply in the case of "declared war or any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
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High ContrEcting Parties even If a state of war is not
recognized by one of them"ly° and in "all cases of partial or
total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party
even if said occupation meets with no resistance. "1^7
Article 6 of the draft was designed to strengthen the
protecting power concept. The draft article states:
Article 6 - Appointment of Protecting Powers and
Their Substitute
1. For the sole purpose of applying the conventions
and the present protocol, each of the parties to the
conflict has the obligation to appoint a protecting
power from the beginning of the hostilities, and must
accept the activities on its territory of a Protecting
Power appointed by the adverse party. If, despite the
foregoing, the appointment of a Protecting Power is
not made, the parties to the conflict shall accept, as
substitute, the International Committee of the Red
Cross or any other impartial humanitarian organization,
The present language of Article 10 of the first three Geneva
Conventions concerning Protecting Powers is permissive. The
language of Article 9 of the fourth convention, while being
mandatory, provides no sanction if a party does not seek the
appointment of a protecting power and provides only a moral
-i Q O
obligation to accept an appointee. rJU Thus the language of
the draft Article 6 states that there is an "obligation to
appoint" a Protecting Power. Failing in this obligation, if
an appointment is not made, the parties to the conflict "shall
accept", as a substitute Protecting Power, the appointment of
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the ICRC or any other impartial humanitarian organization.
The drafter further contemplated the establishment of a
permanent body to serve in this capacity as a substitute
Protecting Power but no specific draft was presented. "
Part IV of the draft Protocol deals with the civilian
population. Its purpose was the reaffirmation and development
of the existing law. The Fourth Convention of the 19^9 Geneva
Convention was concerned principally with the protection of
those civilians who were in the hands of the enemy, ^90 although
Part II of that Convention had broader application and was
directed toward the civilian population as a whole. Notwith-
standing the attempt of the 19l|9 Convention, these protections
fell short of that which is needed in light of the realities
of modern warfare. The proposed draft was designed to
supplement the meagre provisions of Part II of the Civilian
Convention of 191+9
.
Section I of Part IV of the draft protocol contains the
general provisions, the definitions of the objects of
protection. This draft basically accepts the negative
definition of the Secretary General of the United Nations and
that of the 1971 Conference. That is, the civilian population
is defined as "Any Person who is not a member of the armed
forces and who, moreover, does not take a direct part in
hostilities . . . ,,]-91 Section II of the draft, "Protection of
the Civilian Population Against Dangers Resulting From
Hostilities" deals with a field which had previously been
covered "by customary law and barely touched upon by the
Fourth Convention". 192 Utilizing the 1907 Hague Convention,
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the Civilian Convention of the 19l|9 Geneva Conventions and
various United Nations Resolutions as its basis 1 "^ the draft
protocol has set forth in Article 1+5 five specific protections
designed to insure respect for the civilian population. These
specific protections are:
(1) The civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians shall never be made the object
of attack.
(2) In particular terrorization attacks shall be
prohibited.
(3) Attacks which, by their nature, are launched
against civilians and military objectives
indiscriminately, shall be prohibited.
(i|) Attacks directed against the civilian population
or individual civilians by way of reprisals shall be
prohibited.
(5) Nevertheless civilians who are within a military
objective run the risks consequent upon any attack
launched against this objective.
The draft protocol distinguishes between objects which
are of a general civilian character and those which are
indispensible to the survival of the civilian population. The
draft prohibits attacks against objects of a civilian
character providing such objects are not used for a military
purpose. 19i| Whereas in the case of objects which are indis-
pensable to the survival of the civilian population the draft
confers a more specific scope of protection. Article 1+3
specifies that attacks against such objects "by way of
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reprisals Is prohibited". This specific provision, when tied
to the definition of civilian objects set forth in Article Lj.2
which states that "crops, provisions and other foodstuffs,
drinking water, reserve supplies
. . . shall be presumed to be
objects of a civilian character", could be utilized as an
effective means for preventing the use of famine as a military
weapon.
The problem of "precautionary measures" is also dealt
with in the draft protocol. As was previously noted, the 1971
approach of the International Committee of the Red Cross
divided this area Into active precautions or those measures
which dealt with the obligations of the attackers and passive
measures or those obligations on the authorities in whose
control the civilian population was placed. 195 The present
protocol has changed this approach. The precautionary measures
are not designed to eliminate the risks of direct attack but
rather the "secondary effects"^" f an attack. Article i|9
places certain obligations on the attacking force when planning
and carrying out operations when there are members of the
civilian population or civilian objects in the area of
operation. The attacker shall insure that the objects being
attacked are neither "civilian nor objects of a civilian
character" and if the objects cannot be identified as
legitimate military objects the attacking force "shall refrain
from launching the attack." The attacking authorities shall
warn "when ever circumstances permit" the advanced warning,
take or seek shelter.
The question of proportionality is also affirmatively
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dealt with in these proposals. Proportionality, under various
197
names, has been embedded in the laws of war. Here the
drafters have spelled out the obligations of the attacking
authorities in a positive way
Those who order or launch an attack, shall refrain
from doing so when the probable losses or destruction
are disproportional to the concrete military advantage *
sought by them. -^o
Parties to the conflict are also proscribed from attacking
"as one sole objective" an area which comprises more than one
military objective all of which is situated in a populated
area. Additionally, Article 50 mandates the choice of military
objectives, where any one of several will obtain the "same
military advantage", to those which will present the least
danger to the civilian population. An obligation is also placed
upon the authorities which have a civilian population under
their control to take necessary precautions "against the dangers
of attack", to remove them from the "vicinity of threatened
military objectives" and to insure that military objectives
are not "permanently situated within densely populated
regions. m1
"°
The new proposals of the Red Cross also deal extensively
with the establishment of localities which would be under
special protection. This was not an attempt to expand the
protection presently in effect. Article 23 of the First Geneva
Convention of I9I4.9 and Article II4. of the Fourth Convention
provide, by the establishment of hospital zones, special
protection for the limited number of beneficiaries who happen
to be in the zone. However, to receive effective protection,
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the remainder of the population must be transported to the
area of protection. The proposed protocol provides for the
establishment of "nondefended localities" and "neutralized
localities". Such areas are populated sites and "for this
reason the more precise term 'locality' rather than that of
' zone"^ 00 was utilized. The protection is given not to certain
individuals because they happen to be located within an area
but to the locality itself and the civilians within the area
would collaterally receive the protection. Article S3 of the
proposed protocol specifically provides that it is "prohibited
to attack, by any means whatsoever, populated sites upon which
the parties to the conflict have conferred, by agreement, the
status of nondefended localities". Such nondefended localities
are sites located within a zone of military operations. 201
Areas located outside a zone of military operation are referred
to as "neutralized localities" 2^ ancj similar agreement
provisions are offered for use in their case. Additional
provisions are provided for certain works and installations
which contain dangerous forces such as dikes, hydroelectric
dams and sources of power which could present special dangers
to the "civilian population" or "objects of a civilian
character" through the "release of natural forces.
"
203 Here
the contracting parties are invited, in time of peace or in
time of armed conflict, to agree upon procedures for the
protection of such works or installations.
The entire character of this chapter of the protocol is
weak in that the measures, which in and of themselves are
sufficient, are not given the positive and mandatory approach

which is needed to insure their successful application.
Inviting parties to agree only postpones the essential
character of the protection. Providing for the establishment
of localities "by agreement" after the outbreak of hostilities
gives little chance that such areas will in fact be established,
The remainder of part IV of the first draft protocol deals
with special protection for children, an area previously
stressed in numerous provisions of the Civilians Convention of
19^9. ^ Part IV then sets out a general protection for the
entire population with the inclusion of a specific article on
the question of supplies and relief for the civilian
population. This was an area of needed revision because of its
unequal application on the present Civilian Convention. For
example, Article 23 of the Civilian Convention allows the free
passage of medical supplies for the civilian population but
only allows the free passage of foodstuffs for children under
fifteen and expectant mothers. The proposed protocol would
remedy this situation by insuring the supply of goods indis-
pensable to the entire civilian population. °^
The second draft protocol presented by the International
Committee of the Ked Cross
Which elaborates and supplements Article 3 common
to all four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 19U9
(hereinafter referred to as Common Article 3)» shall
apply to all conflicts not of an international
character referred to in common Article 3«
The purpose of this draft, as stated in the preamblitory
paragraph, is to insure "the basic humanitarian protection of
all persons, whether combatant or noncombatant .
"
The second chaoter of this second draft protocol was
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designed to provide general protection for the entire
population. Instead of beginning with a general principle
enunciating the need for unconditional respect for the human
rights of all individuals, the experiences of the past wars
had shown the need to expressly prohibit certain cruel acts.
Therefore, the draft Articles I4, 5» and 6 attempt to enhance
the general principles of humanitarianism by specifically
prohibiting terrorism, reprisals, pillage, rape and indecent
assault - acts which had not previously been proscribed in
the common Article 3, although it can be contended that they
were implied.
The common Article 3 provided only that the sick and the
wounded will be ''collected and cared for." The draft protocol
sets forth more elaborate protections in line with those which
provided for the sick and wounded in international armed
conflicts. The draft provides in Article 7 that
All wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons,
military and civilian, as well as infirm persons,
expectant mothers and maternity cases, shall be
the object of special protection and respect.
In view of the nature of noninternational armed conflicts a
reciprocal obligation is placed upon the civilian population
itself to refrain from committing acts of violence against
the sick, wounded and shipwrecked. This obligation is a carry
over from the provisions contained in Article 18 of the First
Geneva Convention of 19^9 and is made to apply, through the
new draft, to those conflicts not of an international nature.
Chapter IV of the second draft protocol deals specifically
with the protection of the civilian population. It is stated
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that it is concerned
with a sphere so far governed by customary law and
hardly touched by the Fourth Convention relative to
armed conflicts of an international character: the
limitation of dangers resulting from hostilities. 2 °7
The risks faced by the civilian population in the non-
international conflict are two-fold, paralleling risks faced by
the civilian population in the international conflict, as dealt
with in the first draft protocol. They are the risks from
direct attack against them and the risk of secondary effects
from attacks launched against legitimate military objectives. ^03
To begin, Article llj. of the second draft protocol defines the
civilian population in the same negative terms which have been
209
used throughout. 7 The draft supplements this definition, in
view of the nature of the conflicts being considered, with two
alternative but similar proposals which in effect state that
the presence within the civilian population of members who do
210
not conform with the definition or who are individual
combatants "does not prevent the civilian population from
being considered as such."
Article 15> would provide for the civilian population in
the armed conflict not of an international character the same
protections that had been set forth in the Hague and Geneva
Conventions and annunciated in various United Nations
212Resolutions to wit:
(1) That the civilian population and individual
civilians shall never be made the object of attack
(2) That terrorist attacks are prohibited
(3) That attacks launched indiscriminately against
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civilians and military objectives are prohibited
(I;) That the civilian population shall never be
used to shield milit&ry objects from attack.
The draft, in Article 17, also sets forth precautionary
measures which are designed to protect the civilian population
from the dangers of the secondary effects of attack. These
precautionary measures are similar in scope to those previously
discussed in connection with the First Draft Protocol. ^3
Increased emphasis is also placed in this draft on the
means for insuring the passage of relief materials to the
populations of areas engaged in non-international armed
conflicts. Article 29 provides that the parties to such a
conflict shall insure the supply of indispensable food stuffs,
clothing, medical and hospital stores to the populations of the
territory under their control. It should be noted that the
term "population" is utilized. This term is "not confined to
the civilian population but includes combatants and civilians
interned or sentenced for acts committed in connection with
the armed conflict." ^ The draft in Article 31 provides
that "in the case of blockade or seige the Parties . . . shall
allow the free passage of all consignments of essential
foodstuffs, clothing, medical and hospital stores . . .
intended for civilians." Blockade is an effective weapon in
the limited scope of the internal war. ^ However, sucn
action can be said to "deliberately inflict on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part." 21 ^ As such a blockade
would be in violation of International Law. Article 31, with

its principle of free passage seeks to insure, because of
humanitarian considerations, that a blockade cannot cause the




FINDING ADEQUATE PROTECTIONS FOR THE CIVILIAN
VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS
A. The Validity of the Present Conventions
The question readily presents itself, is the present
international law, both customary and treaty sufficient to
provide adequate protection to the civilian population? If
it is, one could stop at that point. Clearly the existing law
has proven to be inadequate. Four out of five victims in the
Korean conflict were civilians and as impossible as it may seem
the toll of civilian suffering in Viet Nam may be even
greater. ^' As stated by Captain Nurick, Judge Advocate
General's Corps, United Stated Army at the close of the Second
World War
How ... is the noncombatant immune from attack?
He is legally subject to almost unrestricted artillery
and naval bombardment. If he lives in a besieged
locality he may legally be starved or bombed. If he
lives in a country which does not grow enough food to
support its population, a blockade can legally starve
him to death. If he lives in an important city, he is
subject to bomb and robot attack of the most
catastrophic nature. True, in many cases he may not
be the intended subject of attack, but under modern
methods of waging war that gives him little protection.
Where does this leave the "fundamental" doctrine that
a noncombatant is relatively immune from attack? In
many cases there still is a distinction. To take an
extreme case there is no doubt that if an aviator
strafed children in a kindergarten he would be guilty
of a war crime. On the other hand the bombing of a
neighboring large munitions factory is unquestionably
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2i3legal. Where is the line between them?
That line cannot be established with definitions. While
it is necessary to define the objects of protection the real
question is in defining the protection to be given. The
problems hinted at by Captain Nurick were present in 19i|9 but
were not met head on by the drafters of the convention. The
general protection of the civilian population was dealt with
in only fourteen of the 159 articles contained in the 7ourth
219Convention and even here the emphasis was on the protection
of the sick, wounded and hospitalized personnel. This of
course places the cart before the horse. In contemporary armed
conflicts the only adequate means of providing protection to
the noncombatant civilian population is to provide protection
which will keep them from becoming victims of war. To be
effective, the protection to be provided must be more than a
declaration of human rights. The protection must be, in the
words of Professor Lauterpacht "an instrument laying down
legal rights and obligations as distinguished from a mere




Professor Pa Ik states:
The evidence suggests that the current condition
of the laws of warfare is inadequate for several
principle reasons:
First, the rules were evolved long ago under
circumstances that seem remote from the nature of
modern warfare;
Second, such remoteness in time and tactics
tend to obscure the persisting relevance of the
underlying policies - the prohibition of cruel
and unnecessary suffering not clearly related to p~,
the legitimate pursuit of belligerent objectives.
Certainly one must establish sound underlying principles
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in order to develop positive rights and obligations. The
most effective principle for the protection of civilian victims
of war is set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.
All members shall refrain
. . . from the threat of
force . . ,"2
Strict adherence to this mandate would not only effectively
promote the basic purpose of the United Nations, the maintenance
of international peace and security, but would eliminate the
need for rules designed for the protection of the victims of
warfare. But such an approach is not real. It does not take
into consideration that the Charter acknowledges the right of
nations to engage in war"-> and further that conflicts within
the bounds of a single state may not be within the jurisdiction
of the United Nations under its present Charter, ^h
Because the 19^9 Geneva Convention for the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War does not go far enough in
providing adequate protection to the noncombatants does not in
and of itself mean that the Convention should be set aside and
a new attempt made to establish adequate protection. Just the
opposite should take place. The 19^9 Geneva Convention should
be preserved as the first step from which expansion of this
needed protection can be launched. \\e are today in an age very
much atuned to humanitarian considerations. Similar consider-
ations, etched in the minds of the world community by the
events of V.'orld War II, enabled agreement to be reached on the
formulation of the protections set forth in the Fourth
Convention. The recent efforts of the International Committee
of the Red Cross in the two draft protocols presented to the
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1972 Conference of Governmental Experts were attempts to build
up the foundation of the existing conventions.
B. The Validity of the Concept of Sanctuaries
and Refuges
The present Civilians Convention considers the problem
of the establishment of special zones within which extraordinary
protec.ti ov ^1 11 be granted. Article li| of this convention
staifij IfttaBt&Jt?1 in time of peace ... or after the outbreak of
hostilities" the parties "may" establish in their or in
occupied territory certain hospital zones and safety zones.
It is further provided that after the outbreak of hostilities
the oarties "may conclude agreements on mutual recognition of
the zones and localities they have created." ^ In a similar
ra-3J3ner the Convention provides for the proposing of the
establishment of neutralized zones. 2^ All the provisions
are permissive and require negotiations between the belligerent
parties to an international conflict. They are, additionally,
not even applicable in the noninternational conflict. Since
they require such negotiations during the course of a conflict,
even with the efforts of impartial humanitarian organizations,
their chances of being meaningfully applied are greatly reduced.
The concept of the establishment of sanctuaries is a
viable one. The Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of May li|,
195U indicates that the establishment of sanctuaries and
refuges, in this limited area, is a concept that is acceptable
to members of the world community. Such positive arrangements
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should be investigated for the use of the civilian population.
This would be one method for increasing the protection to be
granted to noncombatants by gathering them into a place where
they could be insured adequate, special, orotection. The
present system which does not impose an obligation upon the
belligerent participants to establish such sanctuaries and
refuges and which imposes no obligation on the part of the
other belligerent to recognize them, even if such sanctuaries
and refuges are in fact established, in effect provides no
system at all. A mandatory system is necessary.
The establishment of sanctuaries, under a mandatory system,
would have to meet strict controls in order that they might
receive community approval. First, there would have to be
designated an appropriate agency which would handle the
registration of such area as sanctuaries. This agency would
have to set forth firm guidelines which would regulate the
selection, location and physical capability of each designated
area. These regulations would have to include insurances that
the areas designated would not receive any military benefit
which could favor one of the parties to the conflict. They
would, naturally, have to be completely neutralized areas and
should not contain large industrial complexes which would
benefit any war effort.
Mthin such designated areas the movements and activities
of the individuals resident therein would have to be restricted.
It would have to be provided that access to such areas would
be limited to the classes of persons for which the protection
was designed, to wit: the noncombatant civilian population.
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Free ingress and egress of the protected persons would likewise
have to be restricted. It could not be allov;ed to have persons
passing from the specially protected areas to engage in
activities which directly relate to the military effort and then
freely return to the protection of the locality. Activities
within the localities would similarly be restricted to those
essential for the well-being of the noncombatant population of
the area.
The establishment of such areas should be authorized in
time of peace as well as in time of actual armed conflicts. A
state or a party to a conflict would make application to the
impartial agency designated for the control of such localities.
Such an application would set forth the description of the
selected locality and certify that it would meet those criteria
that had been specifically established. Upon application a
provisional status would be granted to the area subject to the
objections of other states or parties to the conflict. Here
a distinction would have to be made between applications made
during oeace and those made during the course of an actual
conflict. In the case of the former, applications would be
subject to the objections of all parties to the convention
whereas in the latter case they would be subject to the
objections only of the other parties to the conflict. In the
event that any objection could not be negotiated it would then
become subject to binding arbitration.
The Secretary General of the United Nations in his first
report on "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts 2 °
made positive suggestion for the establishment of permanently
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designated sanctuaries and refuges. The International
Committee of the Red Cross in its preliminary work for the 1971
Conference of Governmental Experts did not present any proposals
229
concerning this matter. 7 The first draft protocol prepared
for the 1972 conference contained two articles which dealt with
2 30
"Non-defended localities (open cities)" J and "Neutralized
231
Localities". Both articles prohibited certain actions
within the localities on which the parties "have conferred by
agreement" this special status. Thus these recent proposals
suffer namely that hostile parties must agree during the conduct
of the hostilities to grant to the other party something which
might not be in their most immediate interest. The language
must be strengthened so that the establishment of such essential
areas does not deoend upon the whim of the enemy. -*
C. Enlightenment of the V.orld Community
The Civilian Convention of 191+9 provides:
The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time
of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the texts
of the present conventions as widely as possible in
their respective countries and in particular, to
include the study thereof in their programmes of
military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that
the principles thereof become known to the entire
population. 33
The question of the dissemination of the texts of such
international instruments of a humanitarian nature was the
subject of special comment by the Secretary General of the
United Nations in his report on Resoect of Human Fights in
Armed Conflicts. 3k jt was the opinion of the Secretary
General that the dissemination of such texts as well as
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regulations adopted at the local level would "appear to be
particularly significant." 2^ Today the efforts of the United
States are towards the education of the military community in
their role in the laws of war. More effort must be placed on
making the entire population aware of all the humanitarian
considerations which are set forth in existing laws and also
of those being proposed. Such efforts are in fact being made
in some countries. It is significant that the Federal Republic
of Germany, in commenting to the Secretary General's suggestion
stated that it was their opinion that "particular attention
and support" ^ should be given such proposals and that
teaching aids for the instruction of military
personnel in international law-which might be
supplemented by those developed for use in civilian
education programmes-are a most suitable means for
imparting better knowledge of the pertinent views
held in foreign countries and of identifying the
points at issue. 37
Professor Falk in stating that the present rules "need to
be restated and the climate for their effective implementation
needs to be created" -* which would carry the need for
education to a higher level. Professor Falk calls for the
convening of a second series of Hague Conferences. Such
conferences would, in the words of Professor Falk, be
"political occasions ... on which a new moral and legal
consensus is formed. "239
Notwithstanding efforts currently being made, new efforts
should be undertaken to educate the community as a whole.
Such an educational process should be conducted on a dual basis.
First there should be adequate attempts made to make the public
aware of what protections currently exist. Only through such
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an awareness can the public become an effective check to
insure compliance with the established rules of protection by
the world community leaders. Secondly, the defects of the
existing regulations must be emphasized in order to formulate
effective support for change in a positive direction.
D. The Need for Active and Passive Precaution
to Insure the Protection of the Civilian
The efforts of the past have been aimed at providing
adequate "active" precautionary measures designed to spare the
civilian population. That is, those types of measures which
provide that a party launching an attack must take certain
affirmative actions to insure that attacks are not launched
against civilian objects. Article 26 of the IVth Hague
Convention of 190? provided that the "officer in command of an
attacking force must ... do all in his power to warn the
authorities". Eut the obligation on the part of the authorities
is just as great. The Secretary General in his studies and the
International Committee of the Fed Cross in their preliminary
works have also approached this problem. The Secretary General
has stated that the substance of any standard minimum rules
for the protection of civilians must establish norms relating,
inter alia , to
the taking of all necessary steps by parties to
the conflict to protect the civilian population
subject to their authority, from the dangers to which
they might be exposed in an attack, in particular, by
removing them from the vicinity of objectives of
military importance likely to be attacked. 2i-l°
Modern warfare renders difficult the protection of
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civilians. The military arm of a party to a conflict must
exercise that degree of caution which will allow for the
reduction of suffering to the civilian population. But this
protection must be two edged. Those who have control over the
population must take affirmative measures to insure that the
civilian is not "in the line of fire". This was appreciated
by the International Committee of the Red Cross in their draft
protocol. ^
The problems in placing such a burden upon the authority
in control of the population are great. That authority may
not have the means to evaluate the population. Military
objects, by their nature, may not be removable from centers of
population. In noninternational armed conflicts definite
fronts may not be established making the problem of the removal
of persons or objects almost impossible. Finally, in occupied
areas, a mandate for the removal of personnel may be greatly
abused. Notwithstanding the objections, affirmative steps must
be taken to place a burden upon those in control of the
civilian population to insure that they are not placed in areas
of maximum hazard.
E. The Need to Revitalize the Concept of the
Protecting Power
The system of Protecting Powers is deeply embedded in the
laws of war. Yet the system as presently established has not
been successful. Protecting powers have not been appointed
because parties to a conflict have been unable to agree upon
who should serve or the conflict has been of such a short
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duration that cease fires have been arranged before the
appointments could be made. Therefore a new system is
necessary. Such a system should have an automatic execution
feature designed to eliminate the inadequacies of the present
system. In order to be effective the system should incorporate
the following features.
1. All parties to the convention would in time of peace
draw up a list of states which would be acceptable to them as
Protecting Fowers. Such lists would then be submitted to an
impartial international agency such as the ICRC. The
designated agency would keep such lists in confidence. In the
event of a conflict between parties to the convention this
agency would advise the parties of those States which were
mutually agreeable to them and negotiate the final selection.
2. In the event agreement could not be reached within
a designated period of time or in the event there were no
mutually acceptable states on the lists of the parties then
there would be an automatic acceptance of the International
Committee of the Red Cross as a substituted Protecting Power.
3. In the event of armed conflict not of an international
nature or between a state not party to the convention the
International Committee of the Red Cross or "similar-
humanitarian organization" would be empowered to act. Such a
feature could be made possible through the general acceptance
of such a convention feature so that it would have the effect
of customary international law.
Over the course of the years nations have gathered
together to formulate rules that would diminish the suffering
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that was inflicted on all participants during the course of
an armed conflict. These efforts have produced numerous
international conventions designed to provide protection to
the combatant victims. Eut in the area of protection for the
civilian victims of armed conflict, the protection has been
slow in coming forth. It was not until 19i|9 that the civilian
population was even considered as warranting protection in
their own right. VJe have seen that the protection granted,
while a beginning, is lacking in several areas. Recent
proposals presented during the 1972 Conference of Governmental
Experts will help to eliminate some of the deficiencies but
these proposals do not go far enough.
It is idealistic to presume that nations can agree on a
system of protections that will provide optimum protection
for all the victims of war. Nevertheless it is necessary to
begin the consideration of these areas with the most far
reaching goals possible. For only with the idea of arriving
at a system which will provide the most Utopian protection
possible will the ultimate guarantees provided by those
minimum orotections effectively shield the noncombatant






Tho terras "civilian population" and " none orabat ants"
are used interchangably to include all peaceful inhabitants
not attached to a accompanying the armed forces,.
pCommentary : IV Geneva Convention 5 ( J. Pictet ed
1953 )
.
^23 Enclyclopedia Britannica 201 (1972); the U.S.
Senate Judiciary subcommittee on refugees estimated that the
total civilian war casualties in South Vietnam from March 30,
1972, to mid- June 1972 was nearly 80,000. The Evening Star
(Washington, D.C.) June 16, 1972, A-6, col. 5 & 6.
^"For a summary of the contents of the Civilian
Convention of The 19i|-9 Geneva Conventions see G. Draper, the
Red Cross Conventions 27 (1958).
-'Though internal conflict is not a new phenomenon in
the international legal order - brothers have been fighting
each other since Cain slew Abel - it has swollen into
epidemic proportions in the last two and a half decades. One
observer culled from the pages of the New York Times, well
over 1,200 unequivocal examples of internal war between 19U6
and 1959. Bond, International Conflict and Article Three of
the Geneva Conventions , l\b Den L. J~. 263 (1971 )
.
The most minimal reading of the customary rules of
international law prohibit the acts which took place at Son
My, and yet they happened. Rules of international law do
not insure conforming conduct . . . Falk, Son My : War Crimes
and Individual Responsibility , U. Tol. L. Rev. 21, 71^2
(P'all & Winter 1971); Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision
of the Law of V.'a r, 29 Brit. Y. B. Int ' 1 L. 360, 363 Jl95?T.
7
Lauterpacht, The Problem , suora note 6 at 36I4.J It
is a truism that treaties which are designed to have future
applicability are drafted in terms of problems which have
arisen in the past. Thus the Hague Conventions tended to
reflect the oroblems which arose during the Franco Prussian
conflict of the 1^70's; the Geneva Conventions of 1929
addressed themselves to concepts and techniques of World V.ar
I; the Geneva Conventions of 19U9 were concerned with matters
of controversy arising from World War II. Shull, Counter
Insurgency and the Geneva Conventions , 3 Int'l L. 1+9, 50




Gottlieb, International Assistance to Civilian
Populations in Armed Conflicts
. L N.Y.'J.J. Int'l. L. & Pol
1*03 (1971); Factors leading to this decline as listed by
Mr. Gottlieb are:
(1) Modern warfare techniques cannot differentiate
between combatant and noncombatant
(2) The concept of "oeoples wars" put men, women
and children against the technology of the adversary
(3) The guerrilla ideology of terror tactics
(i\) The media bring the horror to the home
(5) Conditions in some developing countries are so
bad that they submit to terror without outcry
(6) Totalitarian regimes
(7) "Just" political struggles
(8) Fear of involvement in foreign wars,
ID at I4OI*; cf. 39 Am. J. Int'l. L. 731*, 735 (191*5).
9
Nurick, The Distinction Between Combatant and Non-
Combatant in the Law of War, 39 Am. J. Int'l. L. 660. 651(W).
10
W. DeHart, Observations on Military Law 37 (1362).
J. ^ller, The Generalship of A l exander The Great
63 (1953).
12Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the
Urgent Necessity for their Revision, 1*5 Am. T. Int'l. L. 37,Fnvmrr—
1




^MILITARY NECESSITY. The principle of military
necessity permits a belligerent to apply only that degree and
kind of regulated force, not otherwise prohibited by the laws
of, war, recuired for the Dartial or complete submission of
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life
or physical resources.
HUMANITY. The principle of humanity prohibits the
employment of any kind or degree of force not necessary for
the purpose of the war.
CHIVALRY. The principle of humanity forbids the
resort to dishonorable means, expedients or conduct,
see. U.S. Dep't. of the Navy, NWTP 10-2, Lavis of Naval
Warfare, art. 220 (1955).
1
^Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 191*9 , 26 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l. L. 291*, 319 (191*9).
ID; Professor Lauterpacht summarizes the development
as follows:
"The distinction between armed forces and civilians
is generally appreciated to have been affected by
I The growth of the number of combatants
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ii The growth of the number of noncombatants engaged
In war preparations
ill The development of aerial warfare
iv Economic measures which result in the civilian
Dopulation being no longe. immune from the hardships and
prevation of war.
v The advent of totalitarian states in which the
life and property of the individual are entirely dominated
by the state and utilized in a rigidly regimented fashion
for the purpose of the war economy.
see Oopenhelm's International L,aw 207-3 (Lauterpacht ed,
7th Ed 1957 ) hereafter cited as Oppenheim - Lauterpacht..
17
R. Baxter, The Duty of Obedience to the Belligerent
Occupant , 27 Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 235, 25cJ (1950).
1 ft
It Is believed tisat, if the facts of war, especially
when viewed in the light of developments during the two V.orld
Vars, are taken into consideration without prejudice, there
ought to be no doubt that the British and American view is
correct. It is impossible to sever the citizens from their
state and the outbreak of war between two states cannot but
make their citizens enemies. Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, supra
note 16 at 205.
.
19 r'7M. Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land V.arfare 53
(1959); Lauterpacht, supra note at 363-78; Nurick, supra note
6 at 680; Oppenheim - Lauterpacht suora note 16 at 52l|-30. .
20Baxter, supra note 17 at 258.
1967).
Greenspan, supra note 19 at 53«
Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, supra note 16 at 52i|.
"^Pictet, Armed Conflict: Laws and Custom , 1 The
Review 22, 2k (March 1969).
2
^H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations 230 (l+th Ed
2




For Text of St. Petersburg Declaration see U.S.
Dep't. of Army Pam. DA 27-162-2 at 277 (1962); P. Phillimore,




^The St. Petersburg Declaration is the "First formal
international act restricting the use by belligerents of the
instruments they may employ to injure the enemy." J. Garner,
International Law h$ (1925); This conference marks the first

Ik
appearance of rules based uoon the orincinle that the
illegality of weapons should oe measured by the amount of
suffering; that they inflict. T. Lawrence, Principles of
International Law 530 (7th Ed 1925).
Morgenthau, supra note 2i| at 230.
31
U.S. War Dep't. Gen. Order No. 100, AG Office (1363);
Draoer, supra note Lj. at I4..
32
Nurick, supra note 9 at 63l.
33
-^A. Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences 256 (1909).
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-^U.S. Dep't. of Army, FM 27-10, The Lav of Land Warfare
(1956).
^6J Treaty for Renunciation of War as a National Policy
(Kellogg Briand Pact), August 27, 1923 (1929), 1]6 STAT 23l|3,
T.S. No. 796, 9U L.N.T.S. 57.
3?ID at Preamble.
^ Draoer, suora note \\ at 3 & k*
^9ID at k*
Convention for Amelioration of the Conditions of the
Wounded on the Field of 3attle, oDened for signature August 22,
136U, 1 March 1332, 22 STAT 9I4O, T.S. No. 377.
^Draper, supra note L|. at 3.
Wiggins, supra note 33 at 257.
^3ID at 257-3.
^Draper, supra note I4 at l±; J. Spaight, War Rights on
Land 6 (1911).
U5Draper, supra note I4 at I4.
** pictet, The Review, supra note 23 at 28; M. Poyse,
Aerial Pombardment and the International Regulation of Warfare
22-50 (1923); I The Hague geace Conferences of 1399 and 1907
at 33 (J. Scott ed (1909).
^Pictet, The Review, suora note 23 at 23.
k3
ID; The second conference was prooosed by the United
States although it was officially called by the Imperial Russian





^ IV Hague Convention on Lavs and Customs of War on
Land, October 18, 1907, 36 STAT 2277, T.S. No. 539 (hereinafter
cited as IV Hague Convention); I The Hague Peace Conferences,
supra note Ij.6 at 136.
50
' Kunz, The Chaotic Status
, supra note 12 at 37, I4O;
37, 1+0 (1951) J These codifications presupposed the doctrines
of democracy, capitalism, economic liberalism, the principle
of the sanctity of private property, the strict distinction
between private enterorise and economic activities by the
states, the Rousseau - Portales doctrine and the strict
distinction between armed forces and civilian population. ID.
51 Plctet, Commentary IV, supra note 2 at 5.
52Morgenthau, suDra note 21; at 213.
53Plctet, Commentary IV, supra note 2 8t 27.
5k^Farer, Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts
, 71 Col.
L. Rev. 37, 149 (1971).
S5
-^Although the ICRC was the prime mover of this
conference they were unable to call a diplomatic conference
since they were only an international organization. Therefore,
the Swiss government, acting in effect for the ICRC, called
for the conference.
5°Lauterpacht, The Problems , supra note 6 at 53*
** Plctet, Commentary IV, supra note 2 at 8.
^Geneva Convention I, opened for signature August 12,
19U9, 6 U.S.T. 311U, T.I.A.S. No, 3362, 75 U.N. T.S. 131.
"'Geneva Convention II, opened for signature August 12,
19U9, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N. T.S. 35.
Geneva Convention III, opened for signature August 12,
19U9, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3361, 75 U.N. T.S. 135.
Draoer, R. C. Convention , sudts note h at 1.
Geneva Convention IV, opened for signature August 12,
19i|9, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N. T.S. 237.
(hereinafter cited as the Civilian Convention).
^Plctet, The Review, suora note 23 at 31.
Thus, for instance, although the Regulations attached
to Hague Convention No. IV respecting the laws and customs of
war on land protected the civilian pooulation in occupied
territory, they did so, in Articles 142-56, in somewhat general
outline. Lauterpacht, The Problem , supra note 6 at 36O.
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Pictet, The Peview, supra note 23 at 31; The full
title of the Civilian Convention is misleading. It is not,
as might seem to be Imolied, a convention for the protection
of all civilians In all circumstances in time of war.
Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions
, suora note 15 at 319.
Lauterpacht, The Problem
, suora note 6 at 361.
67ID.
Kunz, The Chaotic Status , supra note 12 at 59; see
OpDenheim - Lauterpacht, suora note 16 at lj.52 fn. 1 for a
breakdown of the various subjects of the convention; see also
Pictet, The New Geneva Conventions for the Protection of V.ar
Victims
, U5 Am. J. Int'l. L. U62, 1+73-U (1951).
""emphasis added;
the mandatory provisions include
(1) particular protection and respect for Sick
and wounded and expectant mothers
(2) Civilian hospitals are not the object of
attacks
(3) The use of the Red Cross insignia
(1|) The use of the Red Cross insignia on aircraft
(5) Free oassare of suoplies
(6) protection of orphaned children
see Oppenheim <- Lauterpacht, supra note 16 at 3&U«
70
' M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World
Public Order Ij2 (1961).
'"•Stowell, The Laws of V.'ar and the Atomic Bomb
, 39
Am. J. Int'l. L. 7^U (191+5).
72U.S. Dep't. of the Navy, NVIP 10-2, Laws of Naval
Warfare
,
art. 221 (1955)* Pecent developments in the methods
and weapons of warfare have decidedly affected this once
fundamental distinction between combatants and noncombatants.
Oooenheim - Lauterpacht, supra note 16 at 207-3.
^U.S. Deo't. of the Navy, NVIP 10-2, Laws of Naval
Warfare, art. 221 b. (1955).
'^Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, supra note 16 at $2$.
7
^U.S. Dep't. of the Navy, NVIP 10-2, Laws of Naval
Warfare, pg. 2-9 fn 13 (1955).
'Oppenheim - Lauterpacht, supra note 16 at 525;
International law protects noncombatants from deliberate
bombardment from the air directed primarily against them . . .
ID at 526; but see ID at 526 ffl. Experience has shown that
in the absence of the restraining influence of effective
reprisals belligerents have not hesitated to make use of their




ID at art 1+6.
IV Hague Convention Art hS
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78.
79ID at art Itf.
80 ID at art 50.
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Draper, Red Cross Conventions , supra note \\ at 23.
R. Rowley, A Juridical Inquiry Into The Applicability
of the 19U9 prlsoner of Var .and Civilian Conventions to the
Israeli / Palestinian Peonle Coercion Situation 7U~ 5 (1970 an
unpublished thesis G, W, Univ. Lav School).
-^Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions, suora 15 note
at 320.
^Articles 13 to 26 of the Conventions do, however,
apply to a greater range of persons . . . covering the whole
population of the country In conflict. Greenspan, supra note
19 at 159 J Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions, supra note 15
at 320.
Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions, supra note 15
at 321.
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Greenspan, supra note 19 at 168.
"'McDougal and Peliciano, supra note 70 at 563.
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IV Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of Vvar on
Land, October 18, 1907, 36 STAT 2277, T.S. No. 539 at art 22.
9IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, open for signature August 12,
19U9, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N. T.S. 237 at
Art. 15.
90McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 70 at 571.
^111 Hague Convention on Opening cf Hostilities,
October 18, 1907, 36 STAT 2259, T.S. No. 538.
^Article 3 is an article common to all four of the
191|9 Geneva Conventions which provide inter alia for certain
minimum protections including that
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities
shall in all circumstances be treated humanly,
(2) That the follows acts are prohibited
(a) violence to life and person
(b) taking of hostages
(c) outrages on personal dignity
^Bond, international Conflict, supra note 5 at 285.
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^1 M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law 31+5 (1963).
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x>The Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation,
Art 102(9) (December, 1961+)
.
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1 G. Hackworth, Digest of International Law 67 (191+0)
.
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'see Prye, Characteristics of Pecent Arms Control
Proposals end Agreements in Arms Control, Disarmament end
National Security 6J3 (D. 3rennan ed 1961); White House
Disarmament Staff, Documents on Disarmament Matters 1-1+2 (1957).
"u.S. Dep't. of Army Pam. DA 27-162-2 at 277 (1962).
go77 supra footnote 1+9 and accompanying text.
The contracting parties agreed to prohibit, for a
term of five years, the launching of projectiles and exDlosives
from balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature.
Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons
of Mass Destruction in General and Limited Wars
,
36 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 308 (1965); Royse, suora note 1+6 at 22-50; II The
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Land, October 18, 1907, 36 STAT 2277, T.S. No. 539 at art 23.
-^Royse, suora note 1+6 at ll+l; Borchard, The Atomic
Bomb
, 1+0 Am. J. Int ' 1 . L. 161, 165 (191+6); J. Stone, Legal
Controls of International Conflict 55 1 (1951+)
.
^Lauterpacht , The Problem , supra note 6 at 365.
McDougal and Feliciano, supra note 70 at 573.
Lauterpacht, The Problem , supra note 6 at 365.
10
'Taking this article (Article 28) in conjunction with
Articles 33 and 31+ . . . which prohibit reprisals against
protected oersons and the taking of hostages, such practices
known as "prophylactic reorisals," whereby prominent inhabitants
are olaced on the engines of trains in occupied territory to
insure the lines of communication against attack by the
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Greenspan, supra note 19 at 169.
U.S. Dep't. of Army, FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare ,
par. 56 (1956).
109 IV Hague Convention art 25.
110
The Paquete Habana 175 US 677 (1900).

llhID at 6.
Alford, Modern Economic Warfare, International Law
Studies 1963, U.S. Naval War College 356 (1967); Mallison,
Studies in the Law of Naval Varfare
, International Law Studies
1966, U.S. Naval War College 127 (1963 )
.
112
Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 2 at 613*
113 ID at 617.
111;.
11^^Civilian Convention, art 3.
Of the 159 articles in the civilian convention
twelve (arts 1-12) are general provisions, fourteen (arts 13-26)
are on general protection, fifty two (arts 27-73) are on the
status of aliens and occupied territories and sixty three
(arts 79-lUl ) are on internees..
117 S. C. Res 237, 22 SCOR 1361st meeting (1967), at
22 GAOR supp 2 A/6702.
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The Pinal Act of The International Conference on
Human Rights (Proclamation of Teheran) May 13, 1968, GAOR
A/Conf. 32/Ul; see also Hewitt, Respect For Human' Rights in
Armed Conflicts
, 1+ N.Y.U. J. Int'l. L. & Pol. 1*1, 1+2-5 (1971).
119
The twenty sixth session of the United Nations 1963.
120
G. A. Res 21}I+I+, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp 13 at 50, U.N.
Doc. A/7218 (1968).
121
ID at para 2.
122
Sec Gen Peoort, Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts , U.N. Doc. A/7720 (1969), hereinafter referred to as
Secretary General's first report..
12
^G. A. Res 2597, 2k U.N. GAOR Supp 30 at 62, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1969).
^Sec Gen Report, Pesnect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflicts , U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970) hereinafter referred to as
Secretary General's second report.
12
^ID at para 37; The three principles set forth in
Resolution 2UI4I4 (XXIII) are:
(1) That the right to adopt means to injure the
enemy is not unlimited
(2) That it is prohibited to launch attacks
against civilian populations
(3) That the distinction between those taking part









ID at para 1|2.
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Kay llj, 195U,
U.N.T.S. 3511 (1956).
129see Art 23, First Geneva Convention 19i|9, Art 12 of
Civilian Convention.
1?0
-> Secretary General's second report, supra note 121;
at para 5>3 end 59.
131
ID at oara 62.
132
ID fit para ll\S.
I"}**JJ0. A. Pes 26714, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp 28 at 75, U.N.
Doc. A/3028 (1970).
13l;L.N.T.S. 2138 (1929).
^G. A. Res. 2675, 2S U.N. GAOR Supp 28 at 76, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970).
136 G. A. Fes. 2677, 2S U.N. GAOR Supp 28 at 77, U.N.
Doc. A/3023 (1970).
1^7J Sec Gen Feport, Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflict
,
U.N. Doc. A/8370 (1971), hereinafter referred to
Secretary General's third report.
3 Res. XIII, XXI st International Conference of the
Red Cross (1969), see Secretary General's first report,
suora note 12?, annex 1 sec D for text.
3
'see Secretary General's third report, suora note
137 for list of invitees.
ICFC, Conference of Government Experts on the
Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva 2\\ May - 12 June 1970-
Reoort on the V.ork of the Conference, 1 (1971) hereinafter
cited as ICRC Conference Report.
1^1Document I: Introduction (CE/lb);
Document II: Measures intended to reinforce the
implementation of the existing law
(CE/2b);
Document III: Protection of the civilian population
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international armed conflicts
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Pules applicable in guerrilla warfare
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Illicit objectives are those which it is forbidden to
attack. A term covering both persons and objects.
1^7CE/3b at 21+-5.
^ CE/3b at 31; see Art 27, III Hague Regulation (1907).
1^9 CE/3b at 33; see G. A. Res. 2l4.I4.A4_, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp
18 at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7213 (1963) and G. A. Pes. 2675, 2S U.N.
GAOR Supp 23 at 76, U.N. Doc. A/3023 (1970).
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162 Secretary General's third report, supra note 137
at para 80; see also CE/3b at 89-102.
16^
Secretary General's second report, supra note 121|
at para lj.1.
l6l;CE/3b at 8.
165> ID at 130; Secretary General's third report, supra
note 137 at para 36.





1 9CE/3b at 26.
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Civilian Convention 19U9-
171
' Secretary General's second report, supra note 121).









177ICRC, Conf. Gov't. Experts, Geneva 1972, I Easic
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ICPC, Questionnaire Concerning Measures Intended to
Peinforce the Implementation of the Geneva Conventions of
August 12, 191*9," D-.0-1252/b/e, I (April, 1972).
*"*B8sic texts, suora note 177 at 5-3ll
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Part I General Provisions, Part II Wounded, sick and
shipwrecked persons, Part III Combatants, Part IV Civilian
population, Part V Execution of the convention and present
protocol and Part VI Final provisions..
Article 2, para 1, 19U9 Geneva Conventions.
l87Article 2, para 2, 191+9 Geneva Conventions.
188
Art 10 "The High Contracting Parties may at any time
entrust . . ."; Art 9 "The present convention shall be applied
. .
."; see Pictet, Commentary IV, supra note 2 at 86-9.
189
'Basic texts, supra note 177 at Art 10; see also ICRC,
Conf. Gov't. Experts, Geneva 1972, II Commentary, Part one at
2i|-6 (1972) hereinafter cited as ICRC II Commentary, part one..
190
see supra note 65.
191 Basic texts, supra note 177, art I4.I; see also Secretary
General's second report supra note 12l| and CE/3b.
192 ICRC II Commentary, part one, supra note 189 at 79;
As its commentary indicates the Civilian Convention of 19U9
does not deal, exceot briefly in Part II, with the protection
of civilians from hostilities, see Pictet, Commentary IV,
supra note 2 .
.
193Art 25, IV Hague Regulation (1907); Arts 27, 31, 32
and 33 Civilian Convention (19U9) ; G. A. Pes. 2l±kk» 2 3 U.N.
GAOR Suop 18 at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1963); G. A. Res. 2675,
2S U.N. GAOR Supo 23 at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)..
1 ohH Basic Texts, suore note 177 Art kl First Draft
Protocol "Oblects of a civilian character shall never be
attacked, nrovided they are not used either directly or mainly
for a military purpose .
.
''see sunra notes 170-5 and accompanying text; see also
ICRC II Commentary, part one, suora note 189 at 100.
196
ICRC II Commentary part one, supra note 189 at 100.
197
The principle of humanity prohibits the employment of
kind or degree of force not necessary for the purpose of war.
U.S. Dep't. of Navy, NVvTP 10-2, Laws of Maval Warfare
,
para
220b; "Proportionality" like "necessity" is customarily
established as a prerequisite for characterizing coercion as
lawful defense. M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 70
at 21+1..
193




199Removal of the civilian pooulation is subject to the
provisions of article I4.9 of the civilian convention which
prohibits the forced transfer of protected persons in occupied
territories. see Basic Texts, First Draft Protocol, suora
note 177 at art 5l
.
ICRC, II Commentary, supra note 189 at 106.
tV4
-Basic Texts, First Draft Protocol, supra note 177 at
art 53.
202 ID at art Sh-
2°3 ID at art 55.
2C%9U9 Civilian Convention arts II;, 21, 23, 21}, 38(5),
50, 63 (i|) and U4O; see also G. A. Res. 1336, Ik U.N. GAOR
Supo 16 at 19, U.N. Doc. A/l|35U (1959) (Declaration of the
Rights of the Child)..
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^Easic Texts, First Draft Protocol, supra note 177 at
art 63.
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Basic Texts, Second Draft Protocol, supra note 177
at art. 1.
°^ICRC, Conf. Gov't. Experts, Geneva 1972, II Commentary,
Part two, 35 (1972) hereinafter cited as ICRC II Commentary
Part two.
208 see suora note 196.
20
°Any person who is not a member of the armed forces
and who, moreover, does not take a direct part in the
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Convention of 191+9, arts. 19(3) and 23(1); Civilian Convention
of 19U9, arts. 27, 2Q , 31 , 32 and 33; G. A. Pes. 21M, 23 U.N.
GAOR Supp 13 at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G. A. Res. 2675,
25 U.N, GAOR Supp 28 at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8023 (1971).
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^see supra notes 170-5 and accompanying texts.
uCRC II Commentary, Part two, supra note 207 at 61]..
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ruling out the drastically restricted use of Naval Power either
in limited war or coercive situations short of limited war.
Mallison, Studies , suora note 111 at 127; The effectiveness of
blockade in naval strategy has been demonstrated by history.
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Powers, Blockade
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Institute Proceedings, vol. t$k x\To. 3 at 61, (1953). .
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December 9, 19k3, U.N.T.S. No. 1021.
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'see suora note 3
2l3 Nurick, supra note 9 at 696.
219Civilian Convention of 191+9, arts 13-26.
220Lauterpacht, The Problem
, supra note 6 at 362.
221Falk, Son My
, supra note 6 at 38.
222
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223U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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^ID at art. 5k-
3 M. McDougal and F. Feliciano, supra note 70 at 76-7.
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